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Abstract
This text begins with a brief summary of problems resulting from the traditional 
framing of the term “organizations”. It ignores organizing without organizations, 
organizing between organizations, and the fact that organizations can be obstacles 
to organizing. The text continues with the analysis of the newly fashionable term 
“meshwork” as a possible new way of framing organizing.
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On meshworks and other complications of 
portraying contemporary organizing 
Organizations as entities were legal fictions – in reality they were sets of 
actions embedded in larger sets of actions. (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992: 
110, summarizing research results of Melville Dalton, 1959).
After a long period of anthropomorphizing organizations into some kind of 
SuperPersons (more on this topic in Czarniawska, 1997), various pivots in the 
social sciences reversed this way of looking at these entities. A narrative turn 
brought with it Actor-Network Theory and the realization that organizations, far 
from always being macro-actors, can best be seen as actants – units that, according 
to narratologists, simply do something or are having something done to them. 
As to what these actants were doing, the practice turn suggested that they can 
be seen both as arrays of activities (Schatzki, 2001; Gherardi and Strati, 2012) 
and as assemblages of actions (action nets, Czarniawska, 1997). Additionally, 
the narrative approach freed actions from the cage of intentionality: After all, 
as Kenneth Burke (1945/1969) has already noted, “motives” are but rhetorical 
expressions, and intentions can be ascribed to anything – humans and computers 
alike. Some conceptualizations of the role of information technology can be 
useful in depicting the hybrid character that organizational actants acquire. 
Organizations can be seen as “meshworks” (De Landa, 1995a), but they can 
also turn out into “notworks”1,hindering organizing. At present, a great deal of 
organizing happens outside organizations, from hooligan fights through Occupy 
Wall Street to Arab Spring (Shirky, 2008). Thus, as organizing flows over the 
“legal person” frames, new concepts are needed to grasp such new phenomena. 
As suggested by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991/2006: 18), what is needed is 
“… a new and systematic approach to organizations, construed not as unified 
entities characterized in terms of spheres of activity, systems of actors, or fields, 
but as composite assemblages that include arrangements deriving from different 
worlds”.
 
I begin by briefly summarizing problems resulting from the traditional 
framing of the term “organizations” (see also Czarniawska, 2010a; 2013), 
then inspect the newly fashionable term “meshwork” to see if it is helpful 
for dealing with those problems. As I see it, there are at least three reasons 
for studying “organizations” as units separate from their “environment”, 
which can obscure crucial instances of organizing: organizing without 
organizations; organizing between organizations; and organizing in spite 
of organizations.
1 “A network, when it is acting flaky or is down. Compare nyetwork. Said at IBM to have 
originally referred to a particular period of flakiness on IBM’s VNET corporate network ca. 
1988; but there are independent reports of the term from elsewhere”. (http://www.catb.org/
jargon/html/N/notwork.html, accessed 2013-09-28)
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Three reasons why obsession with formal 
organizations is stultifying
Organizing without  organizations
Clay Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations 
(2008) has been dismissed by many readers as Internet hype. After all, he believes, 
like many others, that the Internet will revolutionize our lives – the standard 
prediction accompanying any new technology2. Shirky does not claim, however, 
that everything enabled by the Internet must necessarily be good – only that 
certain organizing attempts, once impossible without the support of a formal 
organization, are suddenly possible. His examples can be divided into three 
groups. The first group concerned the exchange of information and opinions, 
made possible by twitting and blogging. The second described the collaborative 
creation of knowledge, of which Wikipedia is the best example (a detailed 
description of the phenomenon is to be found in Jemielniak, 2014). Finally, he 
presented examples of organizing mass actions, such as political protests; the 
number of such cases of organizing is growing exponentially, and they vary 
from such small events as friends’ meetings, through battles of football hooligans, 
Missing People groups, to Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring.
It must be emphasized that there is no a priori moral valuation in Shirky’s 
presentation of the examples. After all, blogging may be contributing to a 
growing number of heart attacks (apparently bloggers do not get enough sleep), 
and it certainly contributes to information overload. Wikipedia contains a 
great deal of incorrect information, but so do most encyclopedias3— only the 
latter do not admit it, but hide behind the authority of formal organizations. 
Football hooligans use the Internet to organize their fights with hooligan fans 
from the opposing team. Even murder can be organized this way, as Günter Grass 
demonstrated in Crabwalk (2003). Thus, the point is not the moral superiority 
of organizing without organizations, and certainly not a point for individualism 
and against collectivism. The point is that, as Jacobsson said after Robert 
Michels (1949: 390) that “so often, from a means, organization becomes an end” 
(Jacobsson, 1994: 83). So why not eliminate this danger and dispense of formal 
organizations altogether?
This is because it is not certain that those spontaneous movements, organized 
with the help of the Internet, can achieve something concrete without becoming 
formal organizations. In his keynote speech at LAEMOS conference in Buenos 
Aires, Giorgio Alberti (2010) argued that the instability of governments 
in Latin American countries can be related to the fact that the participants in 
2 For a biting critique, see e.g. Morozov, 2013.
3 Historian Norman Davies came to this conclusion on the basis of a systematic comparison 
(Davies, 2011).
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social movements continue to act in the same way when in power, without 
understanding that the state is a formal organization that works according to a 
different set of rules. One is reminded of the 1979 hesitations of Petra Kelly, one 
of the founders of Die Grünen, the German Green Party. Firmly opposed to the 
formal power system, the German Greens concluded that they would not be able 
to achieve any progress without joining it, although they were well aware of the 
necessary compromises. Thus Kelly served as a member of the Bundestag (German 
Parliament) between 1983 and 1990, and the Greens are now a regular party. 
Similarly, there are voices suggesting that if Occupy Wall Street will not formalize 
itself into “proper” organizations, with leaders, strategies, and hierarchies, it will 
simply vanish. It could be that organizing without organizations is ephemeral, 
and that it needs to be transformed into formal organizations in order to achieve 
results (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2010, would certainly be of that opinion), but this 
does not free us from the obligation to study organizing in its informal phase. 
Organizing between organizations
Much organizing happens between and among organizations, in the form of 
alliances and similar cooperative efforts (see e.g., Smith Ring and Van De Ven, 
1992), networks (see e.g., Håkansson and Johansson, 2001), or mergers and 
acquisitions (see e.g., DePamphilis, 2008). This ubiquitous inter-organizing has 
contributed to the legitimacy of meta-organizations, which help to organize 
it (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2008). Indeed, this form of organizing is perhaps 
most studied within mainstream organization studies. But probably the most 
common and least noted is the cooperation among various parts of different 
formal organizations – a joint action. Such cooperation is often dictated by 
necessity,rather than the will to collaborate. Thus an urban recovery project 
in Rome in the rundown district of Magliana along the River Tiber required 
the removal of 43 companies, and included plans for 32 new interventions, 22 
of public and 10 of private organizations (Czarniawska, 2010b). The problems 
and obstacles related to the actualization of this project was partly related to 
the fact that it was almost impossible to ascertain if the number 43 was correct 
and to contact all involved parties; and partly related to the city’s problem of 
maintaining the will to cooperate among the 32 parties, especially as their planned 
interventions had to wait until the formalities were resolved. 
Not all projects are necessarily this complex, but there is no doubt that 
organizations are constantly cooperating; that their cooperation is not always 
easy, precisely because of the formalities involved; and that the issue tends to be 
ignored in conventional organization studies, keen as its authors are on remaining 
“within” an organization. 
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Organizations  can be  obstac les  to  organizing
As I suggested before (Czarniawska, 2010a; 2013), I find the conceptualization 
of organizations as tools for collective action (Perrow, 1986) to be particularly 
useful. It permits one to conceptualize organizations as virtual artifacts. From that 
perspective,  an organization can be seen as combining the functions of dispatcher 
(Latour, 1998) and a translator in a machine that has been given a legal personality 
(Lamoreaux, 2004). An organized collective action means that the right objects 
and the right persons must be in the right places at the right times, doing the 
right things. To be able to send objects and people to the right places at the right 
time, the dispatcher must know how to contact them and how to explain what to 
do. Thus the dispatcher depends on translator services. The translator is needed 
because there is a movement of people and objects; had they stayed at the same 
place, there would be no need for translation (Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996, 
2005).
Humans are not “cogs” in this machine, any more than they are chips in their 
computers. They constructed this machine—this tool—with help of other co-
constructors (thus “social construction”), but once constructed, the machine 
continues to construct them. In such a perspective, organizations are literally 
instrumental: either they work, or they do not. If they do not, they should 
be repaired or exchanged (and eventually dropped, as Karl Weick, 1996, has 
suggested). What is more, they can be designed better or worse, but they cannot 
be designed perfectly. Elaine Scarry’s (1985) theory explains convincingly why 
that is so.
According to her, an artifact’s “reciprocation” (the ways in which it can be used) 
always exceeds the designer’s projection (the intentions of the designer projected 
into the object). As much as they may wish to, designers cannot control the use of 
their artifacts because they design more than they know (the institutional order 
speaks through them), and they cannot foresee all the contexts in which they 
could be used (Czarniawska, 2009). 
Organizations, like computers and other tools, can be used for varying purposes. 
Refusing to account for the functionality of an organization or accounting only 
for its formally stated purposes can overshadow the many unexpected uses of 
organizations – such as the obstruction of organizing. James C. Scott (2009; 
2012) is of the firm opinion that the formal organization of the state has been 
damaging to spontaneous and superior forms of organizing:
Forms of informal cooperation, coordination, and action that embody 
mutuality without hierarchy are the quotidian experience of most people 
(...) Most villages and neighborhoods function precisely because of the 
informal, transient networks of coordination that do not require formal 
organization, let alone hierarchy. [The question is whether] the existence, 
power and reach of the state over the past several centuries have sapped 
the independent, self-organizing power of individuals and small 
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communities.(...) The state, arguably, destroys the natural initiative and 
responsibility that arise from voluntary cooperation. (2012: xxi-xxii, 
italics in original)
Scott did not limit his criticism to the state: “…existing state institutions are both 
sclerotic and at the service of dominant interests, as are a vast majority of formal 
organizations that represent established interests.”(2012: xvii). So, although not 
everyone may be ready to cheer for anarchism, the stultifying impact of formal 
organizations on informal organizing needs to be better documented.
Of course, there is no need to abandon studies of formal organizations, so 
dominant in contemporary life. But it would be good to return to the definition 
of organizing that extends organizing in formal organizations, as Karl Weick 
suggested long ago. In his definition, organizing is the process of assembling 
“ongoing interdependent actions into sensible sequences that generate sensible 
outcomes” (Weick, 1979: 3). The result of organizing is interlocked cycles, 
which can be represented as causal loops rather than as a linear chain of causes and 
effects. But, and above all, organizing is an ongoing encounter with ambiguity, 
ambivalence, and equivocality, part of a larger attempt to make sense of life and 
the world. 
Some newer frames: networks, actor-networks  
and action nets
Networks
The idea of networks was supposed to change the traditional way of portraying 
organizations as specialized offices (bureaus) arranged in a hierarchical manner 
and the traditional way of seeing markets as “free” – that is, not organized (see 
e.g. Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). 
The idea of networks has become extremely popular when supported by 
the emergence of the Internet, not the least in the military context. Network-
Centric Warfare, or NCW, an invention of the Pentagon (see e.g. Alberts et 
al., 1999), has quickly reached other western army forces, including Canada, 
Singapore, Australia (Network Enabled Warfare), Holland (Network Centric 
Operations), UK (Network Enabled Capability), Norway and Sweden (Network 
Based Defence). NCW has been hailed as “an impressive change in institutional 
culture”, and its guru, John Garstka, an associate director of the Pentagon’s Office 
of Force Transformation has said “that the benefits of flattening the military 
command structure and increasing its networking capabilities will ultimately 
prove irresistible” (Salkever, 2003).
The assumptions behind NCW seem sensible and convincing. The term 
conveys a double meaning: “network-centered” in the sense that it is based 
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entirely on the ICT, on the Web – in its various Internet and Intranet forms. 
The second meaning refers to networking – flexible cooperation and capacity 
of ad hoc collaboration among previously highly bureaucratized army forces. 
The former – a shared information and communication technology – is seen as a 
necessary but sufficient condition for the latter.
According to Alex Salkever, technology editor of BusinessWeek, NCW was 
no more or no less than a hope “to remake a hierarchical, hidebound organization 
so that it can function with a flat management structure, ad hoc collaboration 
and on-the-fly decision making” (Salkever, 2003). But, he added, it could also 
strengthen the traditional tendencies of “Pentagon mandarins” to “micromanage” 
– to make even local decisions. Commanders sitting far from the field miss key 
pieces of local information that did not make it, or could not make it, to the 
Web. Salkever quoted both the criticism and the response to it: “You have to 
be able to create graceful failure modes. If everything goes through some central 
network without which I’m helpless, then what happens if some key node fails?”; 
“We’re developing the information grid so that every platform will have the same 
information, and if one or two platforms fail, their functions are automatically 
taken over by other platforms. Every platform will be able to be the command 
center”. But what if every platform tries to be a command center, as allegedly 
happened with tanks, when each crew member had a GPS map of the terrain 
(Mark Davis, personal information)? 
I have no intention of dramatizing the perils of a network, but I would like 
to suggest another way of looking at it. A network, in the traditional meaning 
of the word, is but a flattened hierarchy in which the top becomes the center and 
the bottom the periphery. This means that the nodes exist prior to connections: 
no nodes, no connections. Can the nodes exist without the previous hierarchy? 
If so, how are they created? Thus although there is no doubt that networks exist 
and multiply, there is also a need for other ways of conceptualizing organizing.
Actor-Network Theory
As the reader is probably well aware, actor-network theory (ANT) originated in 
studies of science and technology, as the result of a fortunate crossover between 
narratology (in the version of Lithuanian-French semiotician Algirdas Greimas, 
see e.g. Greimas, 1990) and studies of successful inventions (see e.g. Latour, 1988). 
It can be said that ANT is narratology at the service of understanding how the 
social is assembled (Latour, 2005), based on a fruitful analogy between a fictitious 
narrative and the production of a research report. In a fictitious narrative, it is 
not known at the outset who is a hero and who is a villain (unless it is a sequel). 
Initially unprepossessing figures conquer kingdoms after having successfully 
accomplished their narrative trajectory, whereas various tokens of power and 
authority (formal titles, golden treasures) may change owners and remake some 
characters while dismembering others. Thus a lesson for studying organizing: If it 
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is known at the outset who has power, who is a hero, and who is a villain, research 
is a waste of time. A study that truly purports to provide information that did not 
exist before begins with the identification of actants (those that act and are acted 
upon) in a given case (that is, an occurrence of a phenomenon), follows a narrative 
trajectory (a series of programs and anti-programs), and shows how actants that 
established associations and stabilized them became actors, or even macro-actors. 
After all, macro-actors are but large networks that are hiding their networked 
character by presenting themselves through one voice of a representative speaker. 
Although ANT can be of great use in organization theory (see e.g. Czarniawska 
and Hernes, 2005), it does not cover all cases of organizing. ANT was constructed 
for a different purpose: It focuses on macro-actors in order to show how they were 
assembled. It does not focus on organizing that does not lead to the construction 
of actors or on the macro-actors that disassemble. 
Action nets 
For some years now, I have been suggesting an extension of the actor-network 
approach to studying connections among actions (Czarniawska, 1997; 2004; 
2008). The idea is to study organizing as the connection, re-connection, and 
disconnection of various collective actions to each other, either according 
to patterns dictated by a given institutional order or in an innovative way. 
Such collective actions need not be performed within the bounds of a formal 
organization; an action net can involve actions performed by several formal 
organizations or by assemblies of human and non-human actants. The actions can 
be connected loosely or temporarily, but the connections may stabilize in time.
I also added to actor-network theory an insight provided by new 
institutionalism: In a given institutional order, certain collective actions seem 
obvious or even necessary candidates for being connected to others (producing 
to selling, for example), whereas other connections may seem alien or innovative 
(open source, for example).
A standard organizational analysis begins with “actors” or “organizations”, 
whereas an action net approach sees them as products rather than sources of 
the organizing – taking place within, enabled by, and constitutive of, an action 
net. Actors are produced by and in an action net, not vice versa. Organizations, 
in themselves products of organizing, become actors due to a repeated type of 
action legitimized by a “legal person” certificate. 
Another product, or effect, of organizing, may be a network. But the concept 
of network assumes the previous existence of actors who make contacts, whereas 
action nets assume that connections between actions produce actors. A network 
that is not part of an active action net is like the robot Hal in 2001: a system and 
a network, but isolated and absurd. 
Such action nets usually transcend any given organization (Czarniawska, 
2002). Public marketing of a company requires connections to such organizations 
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as advertisement offices, city administration, and publicity regulation. Such 
connections can assume a variety of forms: formal contracts and hierarchical 
subordination, but also friendship. As actions thus connected are different, they 
require translation at connecting points. A given unit, with its own internal 
actors and artifacts, may be considered an entity unto itself in a legal sense; but 
many other actors and artifacts, including whole networks, are usually involved 
in an action net. Taking entire action nets rather than mere interorganizational 
contacts under observation unveils a more comprehensive picture of the way 
organizations are formed, stabilized, dissolved, or relocated. It also improves the 
ability to see how actants try to stabilize “their” segments of a net in order to 
form powerful actor-networks (Callon, 1986). 
Different approaches and ways of conceptualizing organizing have their 
advantages and shortcomings, but the fact is that formal organizations, networks 
of actors and actor-networks, action nets and spontaneous organizing coexist – at 
the same time and in the same territory. Nowhere it can be seen as clearly as in 
big cities and their management (Czarniawska, 2002). Although there is always 
a large formal organization called “city administration,” it is a multi-faceted 
hybrid, with parts ranging from the purely political to the purely productive, and 
everything in between. But the city is also an arena for a great many other formal 
organizations, from companies to citizens’ voluntary associations, and for social 
movements and spontaneous demonstrations and ad hoc groups. No wonder that 
it is urban scholars who have searched for a metaphor that will encompass it all.
Would meshworks fit the bill?
Urban studies
Mexican-American philosopher Manuel De Landa (1995a) is usually seen as the 
author who imported the notion of meshworks from behavioral AI to social 
sciences. Although he later continued to use the term in relation to computer 
sciences (De Landa, 1998)4, he used the metaphor first in relation to homes. 
If our minds are thus hybrids of two or more computer-types then we 
should expect out homes to be also complex mixtures of self-organized 
and planned components, or to use technical terms, of hierarchies and 
meshworks. Hierarchies are structures in which components have been 
sorted out into homogenous groups, then articulated together. Meshworks, 
on the other hand, articulate heterogeneous components as such, without 
homogenizing. (…) Our homes can then be seen as mixtures of self-
organized and planned components (…) (De Landa, 1995a: 3).
4 There is also a term “mesh networking” to describe digital connections outside the Internet 
(Dibbell, 2012).
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I return to some peculiarities of this definition. For now I add only that De 
Landa explained in another paper (De Landa, 1995b) that those “hierarchies and 
meshworks” are translations first, of Herbert Simon’s “hierarchies and markets”, 
and second, of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s “strata and aggregates”. 
“Aggregates” are now usually translated as assemblages (even De Landa uses this 
word in later texts), so the connection to actor-network theory is obvious (Latour 
has been also influenced by Deleuze; see e.g., Latour, 1993).
The meshwork metaphor has been enthusiastically adopted by Marilyn 
Hamilton, urban scholar, city activist, and city management consultant. 
She actually consulted neurological literature and established that the term 
“meshwork” depicts
… the emergence of patterns in the brain, resulting from the neuro-
chemical connections of synapses that produce a hairnet-like mesh of axons 
(…), characterized by major primary connective pathways that produce 
and intersect secondary, tertiary and many further levels of connectedness. 
It appears that the meshwork self-organizes connections and when a 
certain density and/or repeated use of pathways arises, a hierarchy of 
complexity emerges that enables the brain to replicate the patterns (…) 
allowing retention of learning and efficiencies of energy use. This cycle 
of self-organizing and hierarchical patterning continues throughout a 
lifetime, allowing the brain to build up a repertoire of learned behaviors 
while continuing its capacity for self-organizing adaptiveness to dynamic 
environments and never-ending stimuli (Hamilton, 2012: 2-3).
In other words, when connections within action nets become repetitive and 
stabilized, a formal organization may emerge. And, like brains, organizations can 
also become sclerotic, as Scott has rightly noted.
Still within the territorial frame of reference, one can find another use of 
the term, “meshworks” this time by the social anthropologist Tim Ingold. He 
borrowed the term from another French philosopher, greatly interested in the 
issues of space: Henri Lefebvre (Ingold, 2007: 80). To Ingold, a network is a set 
of lines that joins the dots (or, in my vocabulary, a set of connections between the 
actions). A meshwork is 
interwoven trails rather than a network of intersection routes. The lines of 
the meshwork are the trails along which the life is lived. And (…) it is in 
the entanglement of lines, not in the connecting of points, that the mesh is 
constituted (Ingold, 2007: 80-81)
The picture on the next page (82) is similar to those I drew when trying to 
illustrate the concept of action nets (apart from the fact that Ingold is famous for 
drawing beautifully, and I am not). 
In a later work, Ingold engaged in a debate with Latour, suggesting that ANT 
departed from Deleuzian insights; whereas his definition of meshworks – as 
different from networks – develops them further.
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ANT claims that events are the effects of an agency that is distributed 
around a far-flung network of act-ants comparable to the spider’s web. But 
the web, as SPIDER explains, is not really a network in this sense. Its lines 
do not connect; rather, they are the lines along which it perceives and acts. 
For SPIDER, they are indeed lines of life. Thus whereas ANT conceives 
of the world as an assemblage of heterogeneous bits and pieces, SPIDER’s 
world is a tangle of threads and pathways; not a network but a meshwork. 
Action, then, emerges from the interplay of forces conducted along the 
lines of the meshwork. (…) Where ANT, then, stands for actor-network 
theory, SPIDER – the epitome of my own position – stands for the 
proposition that skilled practice involves developmentally embodied 
responsiveness. (Ingold, 2011: 84-85)
I am not sure that ANT people wouldn’t agree with the last statement, but indeed, 
even in action nets actions are connected and translated, and, unlike a spider’s 
web, often heterogeneous. But didn’t De Landa claim just that the meshworks 
are knitted from heterogeneous elements, unlike hierarchies? What does the 
meshwork metaphor stand for, then? Perhaps it is necessary to consult its non-
metaphorical use.
Meshworks  in technology and in organization studies
According to a non-metaphorical meaning of the term “meshwork”, all the 
authors I have quoted are wrong. Meshwork is “an open fabric of string or rope 
or wire woven together at regular intervals” (http://www.thefreedictionary.
com), in medicine a vascular network (http://www.merriam-webster.com); - in 
other words, a tightly knitted net. The threads are homogeneous; at most they 
can have different colors, but the material must be the same, because otherwise 
it would be difficult to obtain mesh, which “consists of semi-permeable barrier 
made of connected strands of metal, fiber, or other flexible/ductile material. Mesh 
is similar to web or net in that it has many attached or woven strands.” (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/). Yet even the very high hi-techs speak of their “wireless 
mesh network” (Dibbell, 2012); an oxymoron if there ever was one.
Although Deleuze and Guattari rightly differentiated between strata and 
assemblages, the assemblages they meant were definitely made of heterogeneous 
elements. Why not use the term “assemblage “rather than “meshwork”, 
then? Because assemblages do not produce this association of density, which is 
important, and suggests straighter lines, albeit of different length and directions, 
than the wavy trails mentioned by Ingold. Indeed, Simon’s contrast of hierarchies 
and markets would be good, if in the meantime we did not learn that markets 
are assemblages (Callon, 1998) rather than self-organizing, spontaneous sets of 
actions.
The neurological definition quoted by Marilyn Hamilton rightly speaks of 
“hairnet-like mesh of axons”, but it does not contrasts hierarchies and meshworks. 
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To the contrary, and this renders it fascinating, it says that a meshwork first 
connects itself spontaneously as it were, and only later develops hierarchy within 
itself – produces strata. This usage would be almost perfect, but it still assumes 
homogeneity of axons (nerve fibers). It is the connections that produce a variety 
of behaviors; the meshwork itself is homogeneous.
Tim Ingold’s use of meshwork, indeed as an opposite of hierarchy or anything 
that is planned, departs completely from the literal meaning of meshwork. But 
metaphors are by definition wrong. In technical terms, metaphor is “a new 
semantic coupling” (Eco, 1979/1983: 69); its meaning in Greek being “move”. 
As Umberto Eco noted, however, the common theory of metaphor confuses it 
with metonymy in assuming that it consists of the substitution of one element 
of language for another “by virtue of a resemblance of their referents” (ibid: 
79, italics in original). But it is actually not the resemblance (important for both 
simile and metonymy) that makes a successful metaphor; it is the “short circuit” 
of associations that it is able (or not) to produce. True, metaphors owe their life 
to metonymies: Such short circuits are possible because of the existence of the 
“multidimensional network of metonymies, each of which is explained by a 
cultural invention rather than by an original resemblance” (ibid: 78). Eco also 
explained the difference between acceptable metaphors (where the resemblance 
is indeed visible almost at once) and the misleading ones (where the circuit is 
long, and when accomplished, does not produce much knowledge or aesthetic 
satisfaction). The truly rewarding metaphors are those that produce “the tension, 
the ambiguity, and the difficulty which are characteristic of the aesthetic message” 
(Eco, 1979/1983: 82).
I find the metaphor of “meshwork” attractive because it provokes associations 
to various aspects of organizing, but also because it creates a tension with its literal 
meaning. I would like to use the term in a sense that permits me to pack in all 
kinds of organizing at once. Therefore the density of the mesh is an appropriate 
association. On a given territory, let’s say, a city, there is self-organizing and 
planned organizing, formal organizations and informal networks; action nets are 
connected and disconnected, stabilized and destabilized; actants busy themselves 
trying to become actors; and trajectories of people and things crisscross. The type 
of activity may differ from place to place, but then, in time, another type may 
replace it. 
The meshwork metaphor deftly captures the processes of organizing – of 
the news and of the news production – which I have studied in news agencies 
(Czarniawska, 2012). News agencies provide an excellent example of organizing 
that takes place outside, inside, and between formal organizations; where 
networks, action nets, and actor-networks are meshed together, and hierarchy 
and anarchy cohabit; and where no single worker can (or needs to) understand 
the working of the whole system. 
A critic can say that I am mixing metaphors: I called news agencies 
“cyberfactories”. So are news agencies factories or meshworks? They can be both, 
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depending on what aspect of their functioning is in focus. Unlike philosophers, 
organization scholars are not supposed to create ontologies, but to study 
ontologies (and cosmologies) of other people. So news agencies are also neither 
factories nor meshworks, but can be considered as both. As suggested before, the 
very “wrongness” of the metaphors opens routes of exploration of organizing in 
practice. 
GRI-rapport 2013:3
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